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INTRODUCTION
Interest for the past, ancient symbols, and traditi ons, represents a remarkable 
feature of various civilizati ons and historical periods. Deferent researchers in 
the fi elds of philosophy, psychology1 and related social sciences have argued 
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in favour of a close link between this affi  nity and the underlying processes of 
human self-awareness and self-consciousness.2
The analyses of sociologists, anthropologists and historians have additi onally 
noted that references to cultural, social and societal achievements and traditi ons 
are closely connected with the process of self-identi fi cati on and the urge for 
legiti macy of the positi ons or aspirati ons of individuals and groups in a given 
society and the wider environment.3 In this regard, the conclusion of Professor 
Thomas W. Smith is very illustrati ve, unambiguous and worth menti oning. In his 
broader analysis of the relati onship of history and internati onal relati ons, Smith 
concludes that “people in power invariably espouse a certain view (version) of 
history.”4 
This parti cular set of reasons and dynamics is to blame for the almost inevitable 
link between various forms of societal and intellectual acti vity, including scienti fi c 
research of the past and cultures, as well as creati ve and arti sti c research, re-
creati ons and the inspirati ons from them in arts and culture, with the politi cal 
2 The ontological relati onship between history and identi ty has been analyzed by many authors and in diff erent epochs. One of the infl uenti al 
and notable analyses of this topic is the essay “On Use and Abuse of History for Life” by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. 
This essay represents important criti que of historicism, which, interesti ngly enough, comes from a classical philologist in the epoch when 
historicism and infl uence of history on society is most thriving in Germany and Europe. Yet, besides his criti que of historicism, and more 
importantly in this context, Nietzsche in this essay insti gates philosophical analysis on the interacti ve relati onship between history and the 
needs, aspirati ons and identi ty of individuals, giving suggesti ons and recommendati ons for appropriate usage of historical knowledge and 
traditi ons. However, it is not Nietzsche, but another great German philosopher that is unavoidable and sti ll quoted in this regard. Hegel has 
constructed a theoreti cal relati onship in which history is asymmetrically dominant and greatly infl uenti al over identi ty, self-cogniti on and life 
of the individual. Hegel’s extensive theoreti cal focus on this matt er will lead towards important and unequivocal conclusion that: Any human 
society and all human acti viti es, including science, art and philosophy are predetermined by their history. Thus, Hegel transforms history 
into main causal force of any human acti vity, arguing that every person and every culture is a product of its ti me. This philosophical view, 
known as Historicism, is also a signifi cant fi eld for debate in contemporary philosophy and social sciences. At the same ti me, this conti nuous 
interference of the past with the present and the future are of great relevance for the contemporary research in the fi elds of social psychol-
ogy and social anthropology as well. Hofstede and Minkov, for example, elaborate extensively on the impact of symbols, heroes, rituals and 
traditi ons as part of the mental soft ware of modern man and his understanding of himself and others. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, 1873, translated by Ian C. Johnston, (Liberal Studies Department, Malaspina 
University-College, Nanaimo, Briti sh Colombia, 1998), p.11 
Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizati ons – Soft ware of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperati on and Its 
Importance for Survival, (McGraw-Hill, NYC, NY, USA, 2010), p.4-16
3 History, as a scienti fi c discipline, and historians are familiar with the practi ce of self-portraying of the elites through references to traditi ons 
and identi ti es from the past. The classical anti quity provides us with the illustrious examples, such as: the reference to the traditi on 
of Homeric Achaean heroes by the Hellenic (Athenian) elites during the confl ict with Persian empire, a reference to their mythological 
progenitors, like Dionysus, Heracles or Orpheus by the Macedonian dynasts, the call of the Romans on their Trojan origin, the call of Eastern 
Mediterranean dynasti es dependent or semi-dependent on Rome on the direct legacy and blood lines from the Macedonian Seleucid and 
Ptolemaid dynasts, or the call of the Parthian dynasti es on the direct legacy of the Persian dynast Darius. The medieval and modern history 
of humankind has provided even more illustrious examples of these tendencies. Contemporary trends in history and various related scienti fi c 
disciplines place great emphases on this relati onship, both in the researches focused on the distant past and those focused on modern histo-
ry. Professor Diaz-Andreu, an archaeologist, is among those prominent historians of social sciences and humaniti es that elaborate extensively 
on the diverse connecti ons between the self-identi fi cati on and the needs and aspirati ons of the modern elites and the development, trans-
formati ons and the overall professional history of diff erent scienti fi c disciplines and focuses.
Margarita Diaz-Andreu, A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology, Nati onalism, Colonialism, and the Past, (Oxford University Press, 
New York, USA, 2007), p.32,41-43,57-58
In terms of sociology, parti cularly illustrati ve are the observati ons of Friedrich Nietzsche, who directly connects the desire to explore the 
past with the aspirati ons and views on life of each individual. His analysis which elaborates on the moti ves for the interest for the science of 
history will hint the possibility that the moti vati ons aff ect the view on history. In his essay on this topic the philosopher noted: “If a man who 
wants to create greatness uses the past, then he will empower (and portray) himself through monumental history… the man who wishes 
to emphasize (or preserve) the customary and traditi onally valued culti vates the past as an anti quarian historian…(while a man) oppressed 
by a present need and who wants to cast off  his load at any price (and overcome his diffi  culti es) has a need for criti cal history.” The text in 
brackets is additi onal interventi on by the author of these lines in order to clarify other potenti al contexts.
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, 1873, translated by Ian C. Johnston, (Liberal Studies Department, Malaspina 
University-College, Nanaimo, Briti sh Colombia, 1998), P.11
4 Thomas W.Smith, History and Internati onal Relati ons, (Routledge, London, UK & New York, USA, 1999), p.4
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needs of various elites,5 and, even more importantly, through them with the 
collecti ve identi ti es through history.
Such socially engaged elites are oft en referred to or qualifi ed under the category 
of “politi cal elites.” According to politi cal scienti sts and sociologists, they 
include “group(s) of people, corporati ons, politi cal parti es and/or any other 
kind of civil society organizati on who manage and organize government and all 
the manifestati ons of politi cal power.”6 According to the renowned American 
politi cal scienti st and researcher of politi cal elites John Higley, these groups not 
only promote their views of the past and the identi ti es and symbols associated 
with it, but “by virtue of their strategic locati ons in large or otherwise pivotal 
organizati ons and movements, are able to regularly and substanti ally aff ect (the) 
outcomes”7 of social debates and developments in this area.
This study analyzes, on the specifi c case of the modern Greek society, the 
undoubtedly signifi cant “interest of the politi cal actors for culture” and the 
importance of “cultural identi ti es” in the “creati on and enhancement of group 
cohesion, as well as maintaining of the politi cal communicati on8,” and through 
them the overall development and perspecti ves of society. Focused on the 
identi ti es and tendencies of contemporary Greek politi cal elites, this paper 
locates and substanti vely analyzes the roots of their diversity and inconsistencies 
in socio-politi cal relati ons developed since the establishment of the Greek 
kingdom. However, the analyses in this work are not restricted to the goal of 
making a credible portrayal of the identi ti es of contemporary Greek elites. Their 
wider focus is rather directed towards identi fying some of the features and 
qualiti es of these groups that are important or crucial as capaciti es or liabiliti es of 
Greek society and its leadership to respond to the multi faceted challenges that 
modern Greece, the wider region and the world face.
5 The relati onship of prominent intellectuals, scholars and arti sts, and the process of creati on of their cultural, scienti fi c and other products 
and accomplishments, whose importance surpass by far their ti me and epoch, with the needs, politi cal ambiti ons and projects of certain po-
liti cal and societal leaders, their close ti es and patron dependency are present and well documented in diff erent periods through history. One 
may just recall the illustrati ve examples in anti quity, such as Pericles and Phidias, Ptolemaic dynasts and Manetho, or Seleucid dynasts and 
Berossus, in order to comprehend to tremendous impact of such relati onship for the global developments in art, culture or science. Exactly 
“in this context” reminds us Professor Strootman “one may also think of Berossos’ Babyloniaca, a history of Mesopotamia commissioned 
by Anti ochos I, Manetho’s Aegypti aca, the same for Egypt, and the translati on of the Thora that Ptolemaios II ordered.” Yet, this important 
interconnectedness of transcendent arti sti c or scienti fi c achievements and the politi cal needs and aspirati ons of a concrete politi cal elite and 
epoch persists through history from anti quity to modernity.  
Rolf Strootman, PhD thesis, under mentorship of W.H. Gispen, The Hellenisti c Royal Courts: Court Culture, Ceremonial and Ideology
in Greece, Egypt and the Near East, 336-30 BCE, (Department of History, University of Utrecht, Netherlands, 2006/2007), p.213-215 
On the later and diff erent uses of the work of Manetho and Berossus for the identi fi cati ons and clashes of the elites see: 
Anthony Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzanti um: The Transformati ons of Greek Identi ty and the Recepti on of the Classical Traditi on, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 2008), p.126
6 Luis Garrido Vergara, Elites, politi cal elites and social change in modern societi es, Revista de Sociologia No. 28, (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, 
Universidad de Chile, 2003), p. 33 
7 Ibid.
8 Bucken-Knapp analyzing the scienti fi c approaches to the matt er refers to the arguments of the professor of politi cal science at Stanford, 
David D. Laiti n 
Gregg Bucken-Knapp, Elites, language, and the politi cs of identi ty: the Norwegian case in comparati ve perspecti ve, (State University of New 
York Press, Albany, USA, 2003), p.146-147
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CASE STUDY OF MODERN GREECE
Diff erent aspects of the “case of Greece” are almost inevitable topics of modern 
analyses of the interacti on of archaeology and archaeological heritage with 
politi cs and identi ti es. While most studies of postmodern science related to this 
case are focused on the impact of identi ti es, percepti ons and prejudices of the 
scienti fi c and politi cal elites in the development of modern science and policy, 
already a signifi cant amount of papers analyze the other side of this equilibrium. 
The latt er research focus aims to explore the impact of archaeology, as part 
of the wider spectrum of scienti fi c and cultural acti viti es and processes, on 
the development of the culture and identi ty of elites and modern societi es in 
general.9
In this context, one might view the parti cular moti ves and the challenge to focus 
this research on the case of modern Greece. This parti cular modern society 
represents an important and illustrati ve case of a small country infl uenced by 
archaeology and archaeological heritage, but at the same ti me it possesses 
characteristi cs and creates implicati ons much wider and signifi cant than these 
obvious dynamics. Namely, one of the paradoxes of modern Greece is that while 
this modern society, according to many researchers, is essenti ally modeled by 
the views, visions and archaeological projects of Western non-Greek elites, at 
the same ti me it, or the ideas about, sti ll represents a signifi cant core of the 
supranati onal identi ty of Western elites in the globalizing world. At the same 
ti me, modern Greece is facing a chronic and dramati c security and economic 
instability and insuffi  ciency, and the percepti on of it among internati onal politi cal 
elites sti ll remains one of the most stable symbols and brands in contemporary 
internati onal relati ons. Finally, it is parti cularly interesti ng that in many aspects 
of its historical and cultural development and its contemporary reality, Greece 
stands out from the “Western world” and yet represents its core concepti on, 
milestone and meaning.
This identi ty and the essenti al division of Greek history and modernity is 
parti cularly noti ceable in recent years as the economic collapse and signifi cant 
social and security challenges before the state and society, insti gated by 
instability in the Middle East and the rapid migrati on processes, reveal serious 
issues and future dilemmas in this modern society.10
Many analysts and scienti sts include Greek politi cal elites and their identi ty 
and culture among the key factors responsible for the current situati on. Their 
specifi c cultural “conservati sm” and the general reti cence towards globalizati on 
processes, according to one of the most eminent Briti sh experts for the Balkans 
9 Effi  e F. Athanassopoulou, An “Ancient” Landscape: European Ideals, Archaeology, and Nati on Building in Early Modern Greece,
Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Volume 20, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti more, Maryland, USA, 2002), p.277
10 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical anti quiti es and their uses at the ti me of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium 
Greece / Precarious / Europe, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.5-6
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James Petti  fer, is the fi rst factor that contributes to the contemporary challenges 
of Greek society. Professor Petti  fer lists the “ the centrality of a few politi cal 
extended families within the politi cal elite- the parataxis of the families of 
both major party leaders- the strength of Marxist and quasi-Marxist ideology 
and politi cal parti es, (and) the politi cal and economic infl uence, if not direct 
unmediated power, of the Greek Orthodox church” as the basic problems of 
Greek society, followed by the relati onships with neighboring countries, the 
traditi onal problem of the fragmented Greek landmass and islands and the long-
term dependence on external fi nance.11
But the Greek politi cal elites are not the only local and nati onal elites that 
opposed, faced and were frightened by the globalizing waves.12 At the same 
ti me, they are not the only ones trying to preserve and present their “cultural 
and nati onal fable” as part of the internati onal dialogue and the preservati on 
of its interests in the postmodern world of “geo-percepti ons.” Therefore, the 
specifi cs of this culture, the cultural identi ti es and symbols of identi fi cati on of the 
Greek elites, responsible for, or at least infl uencing, the patt erns and directi ons 
of the development of this society, signifi cantly diff erent from the prevailing 
European tendencies, are increasingly drawing the att enti on of researchers of 
various social sciences.     
In this context, an illustrati ve element of the wider corpus of issues, connected to 
any scienti fi c eff ort to defi ne the performance and characteristi cs of this society, 
represents the inconclusive research of its true nature. The two centuries 
of scienti fi c focus on Greece have constructed two diff erent and completely 
opposed fables. One created and sustained by the classical archaeology and the 
classical philology and another by contemporary multi disciplinary approach and 
socio-cultural anthropology. 
Classical archaeology, which was conceived and occasionally reinvents itself 
precisely upon the territory, the concepts and historical phenomena associated 
with Greece,13 has transformed, through its scienti fi c paradigms, both modern 
Greece and the modern world. The historical and cultural fable that classical 
archaeology created and, in some aspects, maintains is in diametrical oppositi on 
to the contemporary scienti fi c approaches and understandings of the culture 
of Greece, and culture in general, of researchers in the fi elds of anthropology, 
politi cal science, cultural studies and related disciplines. Yet, the long history 
of this scienti fi c focus and parti cular approach, as well as the plethora of 
hypotheses, arti facts and materials created in this process, inevitable lead to 
the creati on of two parallel stories and percepti ons of Greece. At the same 
11 James Petti  fer, The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.3
12 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalizati on, (Picador, New York, USA, 1999), p.29-43
13 Anthony Snodgrass, What is Classical Archaeology? Greek Archaeology  in the editi on 
Susan E. Alcock, Robin G. Osborne, ed. , Classical Archaeology, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK, 2012), p.13-29
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ti me, this scienti fi c development made dramati c impression on the creati on of 
ideas, culture and identi ty of both Greek and internati onal elites. Therefore, 
it represented and remains main ideological matrix in the constructi on of 
the contemporary Greek society and the creati on of all policies designed and 
implemented by and related to the Greek state.
The “stereotypical noti on” and percepti on of Greece created by classical 
archaeology and classical philology can be summarized in short as: the oldest 
European civilizati on;14  authenti c European culture and identi ty with a millennial 
conti nuity, as well as a criti cal impact on the development and values of the 
“west”; a determinant of “western” geography, history and world dominati on.15 
In contrast, the second fable and historical percepti on of Greece created in 
parallel by modern scienti fi c trends and contemporary politi cal experience is 
diametrically opposed and essenti ally denies the fi rst. It can be presented in 
short as: Greece is very small, non-compact; a territory disconnected from and 
inaccessible by land; that because of this, and because of its climate and relief 
features does not have natural resources and is condemned to surviving on 
trade. Historically it is an area of the conti nuous mixing of diff erent cultures and 
foreign infl uences, which are in a constant game of supremacy and conti nuously 
create the multi cultural and parti cularisti c context of this territory.16 
The fi rst “history of Greece” is the fruit of the early enthusiasm and most 
important projects of early classical archaeology. It is the most typical expression 
of prejudices and concepti ons of European colonial and imperial elites, 
infl uenced by the ideas of racism and nati onalism.17 In contrast, this by-product 
of the early development of modern scienti fi c thought remains one of the most 
att racti ve brands, which through its disti ncti veness unites as a communicati on 
code the scienti fi c, politi cal and social elites in Greece and the world.
The second “history of Greece” is a product of modern development of 
science and society. It has built in itself modern understandings, knowledge 
and pluralisti c tendencies in the broader fi eld of social sciences, but also a 
contributi on to it has been given by the most modern archaeological research, 
made possible by the long presence of a multi tude of archaeological teams, 
nati onal and internati onal archaeological insti tuti ons on the territory of Greece.18
14 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical anti quiti es and their uses at the ti me of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium 
Greece / Precarious / Europe, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.2
15 Yannis Hamilakis, The Nati on and its Ruins: Anti quity, Archaeology, and Nati onal Imaginati on in Greece , (Oxford University Press, New York, 
USA, 2007), p.284-294
16 Ibid., p.299-300
17 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical anti quiti es and their uses at the ti me of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium 
Greece / Precarious / Europe, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.1-3
Yannis Hamilakis, The Nati on and its Ruins: Anti quity, Archaeology, and Nati onal Imaginati on in Greece , (Oxford University Press, New York, 
USA, 2007), p.293-294
18 Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, Introducti on: The Cultures within Greek Culture, in the editi on
Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, ed., The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Confl ict, Collaborati on, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 2003), p. 1-16
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The “modern Greek fable” anti cipates the inter-disciplinary, self-refl ecti ve and 
systemati c approach of modern science, but at the same ti me, it is a result of 
the new open worldviews held by the intensively communicati ng elites of the 
globalizing world.19
It demysti fi es one of the largest and most outdated archaeological and historical 
myths of the Eurocentric world, thus paving the way for Greek society to move 
from a positi on of “sad relic”20 of European imperialism, to contemporary society 
that acti vely and fl exibly uses the symbols and past experience in line and 
parallel to the overall development of its capaciti es and infrastructure.
From here, many pose the questi on whether the Greek society is able to 
modernize and reinvent itself without having the Greek elites face the complex 
global transformati ons on social, economic, cultural and security level and their 
implicati ons on Greek society and reality.
In the increasingly popular criti cism of Greece, Western elites highlight the 
stati c, conservati ve and “thoroughly unmodern” character of the Greek society,21 
while expecti ng the reform process that will bring the “Europeanizati on” 
and approximati on of the society and the reality in Greece to those in other 
geographical regions of Europe.22 However, it seems that in their enthusiasti c 
and oft en conceited desire to help Greece part of the European elites today, as 
two hundred years ago when they created the “old fable about Greece” remain 
unaware or insuffi  ciently interested in the local reality, and the culture and 
aspirati ons of local elites in modern Greece.
In this sense, only an overview of the substanti al misunderstandings between 
the foreign elites and the Greek elites throughout the history of modern 
Greece has the capacity to address some of the complex issues arising from the 
contemporary politi cal, cultural and security challenges, which both Greek and 
European politi cal elites will inevitable have to face. 
THE IDENTITY AND CULTURAL 
“MISUNDERSTANDINGS” IN MODERN GREECE
One of the key episodes in modern Greek history that will predetermine the 
path of confrontati ons and contemporary cultural transformati ons is the 
19 Yannis Hamilakis, The Nati on and its Ruins: Anti quity, Archaeology, and Nati onal Imaginati on in Greece , (Oxford University Press, New York, 
USA, 2007), p.94
Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, Introducti on: The Cultures within Greek Culture, in the editi on
Carol Dougherty, Leslie Kurke, ed., The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Confl ict, Collaborati on, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 2003), p. 1-16
20 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical anti quiti es and their uses at the ti me of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium 
Greece / Precarious / Europe, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.,2-3
21 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical anti quiti es and their uses at the ti me of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium 
Greece / Precarious / Europe, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p,2-3
22 James Petti  fer, The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.2
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interventi on of the Great Powers in the early nineteenth century, which resulted 
in the formati on of a new politi cal enti ty and social reality in the territories 
of the southern Balkans. Among contemporary scholars in this matt er, the 
creati on of the Kingdom of Greece is considered a “complex and controversial”23 
clash of identi ti es, cultures and societi es of the East and the West. It is the 
result of the impositi on of the big idea of European humanism, associated 
with identi ti es and social relati ons in Western Europe24 on a small rocky, poor 
and long-term unstable region of the Ott oman Empire. The creati on of a new 
Christi an and European Atlanti s, extracted from the sea of the “mysti cal Orient” 
and its “barbaric” context25, at the same ti me represents a distant asylum that 
conservati ve European rulers would off er to the revoluti onary anti -monarchist 
elites of Europe in the nineteenth century.26 These elites, ideas, trends and needs 
of the Western world, despite the serious objecti ons of the local populati on, 
will transform this micro-territory with crypto-colonial status27 on the coastal 
23 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, 
and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.205
24 Today in modern science the consensus rules that “Hellenism, as a cultural topos (“place/category”), was an intellectual product of 
the Renaissance, which was subsequently renovated (and modifi ed) through intellectual trends ranging from the Enlightenment to the 
Romanti cism” in Western Europe. The constructi on of Hellenism in Western Europe and its adaptati on to the needs of diff erent trends and 
social transformati ons in the West, has been elaborated by several renowned authors at the end of the twenti eth century (Turner 1981; 
Lambropoulos 1993; Augusti nos 1994; Hadas 1960; Marchand 1996; Miliori 1998), and the  XXIst century has seen extensive, elaborate and 
numerous analyzes of all aspects of this topic from the most renowned authors and scienti fi c centers in the US, Europe, Greece and beyond. 
Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on
Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), p.205
25 In The fi rst half of the nineteenth century “there was a highly interesti ng utopian moment, in which Friedrich Thiersch (classicist and 
educator) and Ludwig I of Bavaria (as well as other European idealists) thought Greece could be ‘a cornerstone of European freedom and the 
protectress of Christi anity in the Orient (the East).’
 Suzanne Marchand, What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspecti ve, in the editi on
 Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece: Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896),
 (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.35 
26 For the intellectuals of the Enlightenment, like Voltaire, the (idea of) Greek liberati on did not mean (was not expect to bring) the “creati on 
of independent Greece, but the victory of reason and human rights” over the  absoluti sm of the empires and monarchies. Aft er all, Western 
“philhellenic writers like Voltaire and Hölderlin really hoped that a Greek revoluti on would free them” and many “philhellenes who fought 
in the Greek War of Inde pendence, especially the French and Italian volunteers, had been involved in revoluti onary movements in their own 
countries and in Spain before they landed in Greece.” 
 David Roessel, In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imaginati on, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), p.15, 29
27 Contemporary authors, including several prominent Greek scienti sts, use for the case of the formati on and development of the Greek 
kingdom in western protectorate(s) the terms “colony” and “colonialism,” “crypto-colonialism,” pseudo-colonialism,” “informal- colonialism,” 
“protectorate” and the like, but most of these authors agree that even today we see aspects of the development of post-colonial society in 
Greece. (Margarita Diaz-Andreu, Michael Herzfeld, Yannis Hamilakis, Robert Holland, Diana Markides, Alexander Mirkovic, Nina Athanas-
soglou-Kallmyer)
 Margarita Diaz-Andreu, A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nati onalism, Colonialism, and the Past, (Oxford University 
Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.99
 Yannis Hamilakis, Decolonizing Greek archaeology: indigenous archaeologies, modernist archaeology and the post-colonial criti que,in the 
editi on
 Dimitris Damaskos, Dimitris Plantzos, ed. A Singular Anti quity: Archaeology and Hellenic Identi ty in Twenti eth-Century Greece, (Benaki Muse-
um, Athens, Greece, 2008), p.273-284
 Robert Holland, Diana Markides, The Briti sh and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960, (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2006), p. 45,65
 Alexander Mirkovic, Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identi ty in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843), in the scienti fi c 
journal Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147-157 
 Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, Excavati ng Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nati on in Nineteenth-Century Europe, во научниот журнал
Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Associati on of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.3
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southern end of the Balkans into the true homeland of the classical illusions of 
the European elites. 28
One of the parti es, disproporti onately more powerful in this “clash 
of civilizati ons” were the Western elites, led by the foreign king and 
administrati on29 appointed by them, which enthusiasti cally created on this 
limited territory a reality from the most modern western European myth of the 
day, 30 “the ideal and free” ancient “Hellas.”31 This myth represented a valuable 
tool for self-identi fi cati on and self-representati on of the German, as well as other 
European elites, which felt threatened by the French imperialisti c endeavours. 
At the same ti me, it suited well the interests and worldviews of the growing 
and strengthening merchant class all over Europe, which was deeply inspired 
and encouraged by the anti -monarchist ideals of the French revoluti on.32 This 
overenthusiasti c European philhellenes, indoctrinated through the scienti fi c 
dogmas of the classical history and early classical archaeology, elevated the myth 
of “classical Greece” to such heights, that they were virtually convinced that all 
Europeans and “their” civilizati on, as opposed to the “East”, could trace their 
roots in these rocky cliff s of the most southern corners of the Balkans. In such 
a state of mind, these elites perceived the liberati on of Greece as a process of 
rediscovery of the true nature of Europe.33
Consistent to the European colonialist mentality of the nineteenth century, 
the new Western rulers perceived the local populati on as consisti ng of 
“degenerated” or unculti vated “barbarians” that Europe was obliged to civilize.34 
28 In recent decades, many authors have extensively refl ected on the Roman background and contributi on to the creati on of the “imagined” 
ancient identi ty “Greeks,” and its relati on to the ancient Hellens. These analyses connect the ancient idea and concept of “Greek” with the   
“transformati ve power of the Roman imaginati on,” and the self-refl ecti ve nature that this determinant had for the Romans, that connected it 
to the civilized world and high culture of the Eastern Mediterranean.
 Ronald Mellor, Graecia Capta: The Confrontati on between Greek and Roman Identi ty,in the editi on
 Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), p.79-126
29 Robert Holland, Diana Markides, The Briti sh and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960, (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2006), p. 45,65
30 Marios Hatzopoulos will call Hellenism “the European dearest ideal of that ti me” (the period before and about the independence of the 
new kingdom), which will be useful for the desired local autonomy of the Christi an populati on, to assert itself later on as a completely “ new 
belief about identi ty.”
 Marios Hatzopoulos, From resurrecti on to insurrecti on: ‘sacred’ myths, moti fs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence, in the editi on
 Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.81-83
31 David Roessel, In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imaginati on, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), p.13-41
32 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on
 Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), p.207
 Margarita Diaz-Andreu, A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nati onalism, Colonialism, and the Past, (Oxford University 
Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.79-80
33 The later Western analysts of the hellenophilia of the Western intellectuals at the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, see it 
as a “consequence of the French Revoluti on,” and due to the features of the search for own ideals in the idyllic and unknown they call the 
philhellenism of the Western elites the “illegiti mate sister of freedom.” Professor David Roessel will summarize that “philhellenism was built 
on the fact that the freedom in Greece was linked to the idea (desire) for some kind of transformati on in the rest of the Western world.”
 David Roessel, In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imaginati on, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002), p.30
 Roderick Beaton , Introducti on, in the editi on
 Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.3-4
34 Margarita Diaz-Andreu, A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nati onalism, Colonialism, and the Past, (Oxford University 
Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.127-128
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But unlike the other conquered territories, where the West saw signifi cant 
natural resources and trade opportuniti es, in the new Kingdom of Greece 
the Western elites looked for their own “imagined” and glorifi ed identi ty, 
represented through the illusion of the classical Hellenes.35 Therefore, the local 
populati on in the new kingdom, “even though physically in Europe and (living 
in a space whose ancient history was) for centuries the focus of European 
Enlightened imaginati on, were treated more like colonial subjects.” At the same 
ti me, this “subaltern” people and their elites “had to live their everyday lives in 
the …’imagined community’” … of “the European Neo-Classical dream.”36 
The local populati on of this new and parti cularly symbolic Western “property”37 
- Greece played a relati vely passive and unimportant role in the expensive 
“theatre” for self-representati on of Western elites. Yet, for many liberal 
intellectuals, as well as for the later conservati ve supporters of the “Greek 
project” in Western governments, the identi ty or origin of these local people 
remained an important aspect in the wider maintenance of the mythological 
idea of restoring the ancient roots of the “ever-dominant” colonial Europe. Thus, 
while many European scienti sts, arti sts, statesman and travelers to the Kingdom 
argued that the contemporary populati on had nothing in common with “classical 
Greeks” and had descended from the “mixture” of the new demographic waves 
in Late Anti quity and the Middle Ages38, the philhellenic enthusiasts insisted on 
certain conti nuity. However, even the protagonists of the conti nuity among the 
Western scienti fi c and layman publics were using “every occasion” to specify that 
the modern heirs of the classical Greeks were “degenerated” and “debased.”39 
Even so, this represented no obstacle to the European elites who were acti vely 
transforming this land of “savages”40 into their imaginary “Classical Greece”.41 
The expectati ons of the Bavarian rulers, through the words of Georg Ludwig von 
Maurer, were for the locals to follow the example, because “all the Greeks have 
35 Andromache Gazi, Archaeological Museums and displays in Greece 1829-1909: A First Approach, in the scienti fi c journal Museological 
Review, Vol.1,No.1, (Department of Museum Studies, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK, 1994), p.52, 69
36 Alexander Mirkovic Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identi ty in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843), in the scienti fi c 
journal Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147
37 Alexander Mirkovic Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identi ty in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843), in the scienti fi c 
journal Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.152
38 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on
Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), p.231, и Roderick Beaton , Introducti on, in the editi on
Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.4-5
Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, Excavati ng Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nati on in Nineteenth-Century Europe, Nineteenth-Century 
Art Worldwide, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Associati on of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.4
39 Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One, (Department of 
Museum Studies, University of Leicester,1993), p.37
40 Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, Excavati ng Greece: Classicism between Empire and Nati on in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 
Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Associati on of Historians of Nineteenth-Century Art, CAA, New York, US, 2008), p.4
41 Professor Liakos explains that “Hellenism as a cultural construct (imaginati on) of Western civilizati on was coined by Philhellenes (the West) 
as resuscitati on (revival) of the ancient in modern Greece.” 
Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on
Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), p.207-208
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to do in order to be what they used to be (the idealized classical Hellenes), is to 
mimic the Germans.”42 
Despite all the Western illusions and misconcepti ons, the populati on they 
encountered in these poorest regions43 of the Ott oman Empire in Europe had 
pre-existi ng elites, identi ti es, values, myths and aspirati ons. Although being 
in a disadvantaged positi on in the general process of the development of the 
Kingdom of Greece, the local populati on, with its elites, was constantly making 
att empts to arti culate at least partly its own worldviews in regard to the 
constructi on of the society and the new state. For this local multi lingual and 
multi -confessional populati on, which usually identi fi ed itself with the Romaioi 
identi ty44 and its historical memory reached to certain symbols, fi gures and 
concepts of the Roman (Byzanti ne) Empire, the values brought by the Western 
elites and rulers were less known and oft en more unacceptable than those of 
the Ott omans. Even the mere identi ti es “Hellene” and “Greek”, which the West 
triumphantly imposed in the new kingdom, were unknown in the populati on, 
whereas the elites educated in the “Romaioi” Orthodox spirit saw these 
“Western” names as anti -Christi an and pagan tendencies which insulted the 
grounds of their identi ty.45 
As att racti ve locati on for instability and piracy, these peripheral regions, with 
weak and instable land communicati on lanes with the conti nental centers 
of the empire, were for centuries habitually aff ected by the wider volati lity 
and power struggles in the Mediterranean. Led by pro-Russian elites46 and 
supported by diverse Orthodox Slavic speaking, Vlach speaking and Albanian 
speaking elites and outlaws in the Balkans, the local chieft ains, who had long 
been semi-independently surviving due to smuggling and piracy in the Aegean 
and beyond, started the insurgence, later referred to as “Greek Revolt”.47  While 
many researchers relate the western interventi on to the situati on that the local 
42 Georg Ludwig von Maurer was a member of the regency council of  minor King Ott o.
Alexander Mirkovic Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identi ty in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843), in the scienti fi c 
journal Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.149
43 Richard Clogg, А Concise History of Greece, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 1997, fi rst printed 1992), p.48
44 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on
Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), pр.214,220-221
45 Not only throughout the Middle Ages, but also by the end of the eighteenth century and later, the views of many local intellectuals and lead-
ers remain consistent. One such example is the evangelist Kosmas ο Aitolôs, who was spreading among the people of Epirus the “Christi an 
language” - Greek while at the same ti me reminding the Epirots that: “you are not Hellenes” because “you are not unbelievers, hereti cs, 
atheists, but you are pious Orthodox Christi ans.”
Dimitris Livanios, The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nati onalism, and Collecti ve Identi ti es in Greece, 1453-1913, in the editi on
Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), pp. 256-258, 264
46 Marios Hatzopoulos, From resurrecti on to insurrecti on: ‘sacred’ myths, moti fs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence, in the editi on
Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.81-86
47 Marios Hatzopoulos, From resurrecti on to insurrecti on: ‘sacred’ myths, moti fs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence, in the editi on
Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.81-86
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pirate elites preyed on shipping,48 the Anglo-French pressure and facilitati on and 
the measures of the later Bavarian led government did not stabilize the rugged 
coastline. In the following years, through the “Bavarocracy” and aft er, these 
local elites would cause constant instability, through mutual confl icts, armed 
clashes and ruthless executi ons, and deeply rooted mistrust and divisions along 
the lines of the linguisti c and religious diff erences, but above all on the bases 
of the local and tribal identi ti es. Living on the edges of the empire, they were 
accustomed to living in the volati le Aegean and did not easily adapt to att empts 
for centralizati on and functi onality of the new Greek Kingdom.
A parti cularly important aspect of cultural “misunderstandings”49 with the new 
Western rulers was the fact that the local majority, led by the Orthodox elites, as 
well as many local leaders associated their identi ty with the orthodox traditi ons 
in the Ott oman empire, inherited from Byzanti um. Therefore, they viewed the 
new kingdom only as a hotbed of confl ict and support to the restorati on of the 
Orthodox Romaioi Empire.50 The “imaginary Hellada”51 born in the conscience 
of the Western liberal elites52 as a compact state enti ty did not exist even in the 
distant “classic history”, hence it had neither state traditi ons nor symbols around 
which the local people or the elite of the wider region would create their own 
mysti fi cati ons. 
In such conditi ons, the history of modern Greece represents two centuries 
long “cultural war”. As defi ned by the prominent historian from the University 
of Athens, Professor Liakos, it was a “struggle over memories”53, between the 
multi cultural traditi ons of the local elites of this important crossroad of cultures 
in the Mediterranean and the oppressive idea of “pure”54 and “perfect” classical 
culture and authenti c mimesis of the imagined “ancient Hellada.”55
48 James A. Wombwell, The Long War Against Piracy: Historical Trends, (Combat Studies Insti tute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, USA, 2010), p 6
49 Suzanne Marchand, What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspecti ve, во едицијата
 Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.41
50 Marios Hatzopoulos, From resurrecti on to insurrecti on: ‘sacred’ myths, moti fs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence, in the editi on
 Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.83-85
51 Ronald Mellor, Graecia Capta: The Confrontati on between Greek and Roman Identi ty, in the editi on
 Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), p.79-126
52 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: 
Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.207-208
 Suzanne Marchand, What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspecti ve, in the editi on
 Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.33-42
53 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: 
Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.234
54 Yannis Hamilakis, The Nati on and its Ruins: Anti quity, Archaeology, and Nati onal Imaginati on in Greece , (Oxford University Press, New York, 
USA, 2007), р.94
55 Constanze Guthenke, Placing Modern Greece: The Dynamics of Romanti c Hellenism, 1770-1840, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 
2008), p.2-3
 Dimitris Livanios, The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nati onalism, and Collecti ve Identi ti es in Greece, 1453-1913, in the editi on Katerina Zacha-
ria, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), 
p. 267-267
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This process began and received its insti tuti onal dimensions when the 
“’Protecti ng Powers’ imposed a monarchical form of government on Greece 
and young Ott o, the second son of King Ludwig of Bavaria, was appointed (by 
them) King of Greece.” The new kingdom was ruled by a council of foreigners, 
and these new rulers “showed litt le (or no) understanding and sensiti vity for the 
Greek reality,” and the identi ti es and aspirati ons of the local elites. 56  
On the contrary, the advent of the new western king in these poor lands which 
were predominantly populated by Romaioi, 57 who spoke several diff erent 
languages, meant complete reorganizati on and transformati on of this geography. 
It was focused on creati ng and imposing the almost unknown classical Hellenic 
name, the classical identi ty and values in the space of the new kingdom, as 
well as erasing the traditi ons of local elites. As in the case of all colonies of 
the nineteenth century, these local elites were called barbaric and unworthy 
subjects. In this context, the words of the Bavarian state (royal) architect, who 
welcomed King Ott o, are more than illustrati ve. He would salute his patron with 
the words: “Your majesty stepped today, aft er so many centuries of barbarism, 
on this celebrated Acropolis”, where “all the remains of barbarity will be 
removed.”58
The project of Europeanizati on project of the new kingdom began with 
signifi cant politi cal symbolism and specifi c ceremonial. Abandoning the centres 
and traditi ons of the local community and the “Greek uprising,” the Bavarian 
administrati on placed the capital of its new king “Ott o of Greece” in a small 
village in the predominantly Arvaniti c speaking Atti  ca, which was located on the 
site where once upon a ti me in the “classical eras” ancient Athens59 was situated. 
One of the most eminent scholars of modern Greek history, the Briti sh historian 
Richard Clogg, rightly concludes that this politi cal gesture “symbolized the extent 
to which cultural orientati on of the new state was to be infl uenced and indeed 
distorted by the burden of (Western romanti c visions of) the Greek classical 
past.”60
In the following period, the Western rulers and mentors set up the “enti re 
ideological structure of the new state as a reminder of the ancient Greek world.” 
This acti vity meant that from “Ancient Athens,” the “Hellenic” western kings 
broke down the traditi ons, culture and identi ti es of local elites throughout the 
56 Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One, (Department of 
Museum Studies, University of Leicester,1993), p.44
57 Richard Clogg, А Concise History of Greece, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 1997, fi rst printed 1992), p. 48
58 Alexander Mirkovic Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identi ty in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843), in the scienti fi c 
journal
 Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.152-153
59 Hamilakis associates the process also with the rebuilding of Sparta, as the “second city in the kingdom” 
 Yannis Hamilakis, Eleana Yalouri, Sacralising the Past – Cults of Archaeology in Modern Greece, Archaeological Dialogues - Volume 6 , Issue 
02, (1999, (Cambridge University Press, UK), p.125
60 Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One, (Department of 
Museum Studies, University of Leicester,1993), p.45
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kingdom, replacing them with their “classical illusions.” As the royal architect 
promised his King Ott o, “all the remains of barbarity (including toponymy, 
architecture, language, culture, traditi ons and symbols of the populati on) will be 
removed … in all Greece, and the remains of the glorious (classical) past will be 
brought in new light, as solid foundati on for glorious present and future.”61 
One of the aspects of the “de-barbarizati on” of the new kingdom was the 
extensive change of toponymy with which the new rulers and elites close to 
them put their hand on one of the most important aspects of pre-nati onal 
identi ty, in order to integrate a wider territory in the image of the “restored 
Hellada.” This policy of “acculturati on” encompassed even the “names that had 
acquired a commemorati ve value, parti cularly since the Revoluti on of 1821”, that 
“were oft en replaced by obscure, anti quated denominati ons (like) Tripoli in place 
of Tropolitza, Aigion in place of Vosti tsa, Kalamai in place of Kalamata, Amphissa 
in place of Salona, Lamia in place of Zitouni, Agrinion in place of Vlachori), etc.” 62 
The fact that in 1909 there was a proposal for one third of the villages in Greece 
to change their names speaks about the extensive modifi cati on of the local 
toponyms and culture, in order to remove all the “non-classical” names, and with 
them the non-classical aspects of the past in modern Greece. 63
Finally, many of famed topoi of the “Greek uprising” were transformed into 
auxiliary areas, in which local villagers lived with the dynamics of the acti viti es 
of the French, English, German or American diplomats, archaeologists, tourists 
and enthusiasts who intensively dug out of the ground the classical citi es and 
arti facts. The magnitude of this overwhelming transformati on is shown by the 
fact that one of the remarkable Balkan regional leaders from Thessaly, regarded 
as the most signifi cant early protagonist of the Greek state project, had to 
enter into the Greek nati onal pantheon under a changed name. Thus, the Vlach 
speaking Riga from Velesti no, because of the Slavic name of his birthplace, was 
inscribed in the Greek historiography according to the name of the ancient 
Thessalian city Pherae, and posthumously called Riga of Pherae (Feres).64 
61 Alexander Mirkovic, Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identi ty in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843), in the scienti fi c 
journal Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.152-153
62 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on
 Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), p.232
63 Margarita Diaz-Andreu, A World History of Nineteenth-Century - Archaeology, Nati onalism, Colonialism, and the Past, (Oxford University 
Press, New York, USA, 2007), p.106
 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on
 Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), p. 231-232
 Pavlos Hatzopoulos, The Balkans beyond Nati onalism and Identi ty: Internati onal Relati ons and Ideology, (I.B.Tauris & Co, London, UK & New 
York, USA, 2008), p.10
64 This way the Vlach speaking ideologist of the Romaioi Empire in the second half of the eighteenth century, through the classical archeological 
site close to his birth place, will be connected to the new Hellenic identi ty of the Kingdom. 
 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on
 Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burling-
ton, USA, 2008), p.232-233
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Tourists and iti nerants, already heavily infl uenced by classical tomography, 
now drew the modern Greek reality moving through the extensive network 
of archaeological sites that classical literary traditi on had transformed into an 
exciti ng reality of modernity. 65
The creati on of this imaginary “classical” nati on, through the “Hellenizati on 
of Modern Greece” did not limit itself to “hellenizati on of the space” of the 
kingdom.66 Shortly aft er the proclamati on of the kingdom, the Romaioi language, 
which was the language of high culture of all Christi ans in the Balkans, was 
named “barbaric” or “barbarized”.67 The “pure” language of the realm had to be 
connected to the arti fi cial language of classical literature, familiar to classically 
educated Western elites and the fi cti onal link with the ancient identi ty suggested 
tendencies of absolute mimesis,68 which is best illustrated by the ideal of the 
period: “that if any ancient Greek were to rise from the dead, he would (should) 
recognize his language”.69
Modern science states that “the fi rst fi ft y years of the life of the Modern Greek 
state (1830-1880) could be described as a period of Hellenizati on of the Greek 
language” that “purged [the language] of words and expressions of Turkish, 
Italian, Slavic and Albanian origin.”70 Thus, during the nineteenth century, the 
modern Romaic language called Romeika (Roméika),71  from spoken language, 
that was a “daughter” of ancient Hellenic language and the imperial Koine,72 was 
transformed into an arti fi cial redesigned copy of ancient literature. This form was 
not only unrecognizable to the Vlach speaking, Slavic speaking, Albanian speaking 
people and residents of the kingdom, but was not near to any of those elites and 
groups who spoke the Romaioi language. 73
65 Suzanne Marchand, What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspecti ve, in the editi on
 Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.40-41
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USA, 2007), p.289
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Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.222
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These and such eff orts towards acculturati on and “civilizing” the inhabitants 
of the Kingdom according to the ideas and criteria for the “Classics” of its new 
rulers intensively changed the space and culture, but also met with obstacles and 
oppositi on in the aspirati ons, percepti ons and values of the weaker side in the 
“cultural war” on this limited territory on the margins of the Balkans. While the 
new Western rulers “civilized” Greece with great commitment and enthusiasm, 
the local populati on and elites expressed their “resistance (and refused to live 
in) this European neo-classical dream.”74 Opposing the new government and its 
policies, local and Orthodox elites arti culated diff erent and multi faceted politi cal 
and ideological alternati ves to the process of “Hellenizati on” that systemati cally 
removed their traditi ons, culture, symbols, identi ty and local social relati ons.75
The misunderstanding of these representati ves of the two “civilizati ons” and 
the various social groups and individuals who favoured them, created a deeply 
divided society. According to the scienti fi c community, this division originated 
from their diff erent love and understanding of the same country.76 While for 
the ruling Europeans, “Greece was the cradle of (their) culture and valuable 
anti quity,” for the local elites “it was home that they spilled their blood for,” and 
that they aspired to independently manage and develop according to their local 
interests and traditi ons and more freely than ever.77 
The local populati on and many representati ves of their elites gave diff erent 
forms of resistance to changes in the toponyms, architecture, language, culture, 
traditi ons, symbols and identi ty of the populati on. For many representati ves of 
the local elites, key aspects of their culture were the lineal ti es and the closed 
patriarchal communiti es at the Greek banks that have been parti cularized for 
centuries. They opposed the various trends of centralizati on early, whereas 
the confrontati on with the “European Hellenism”78 took place on the issue of 
changing the names of places that, together with the religion, were the most 
important aspects of their pre-modern identi ty. An additi onal problem for the 
process of change was the demoti c movement that for more than a century 
74 Alexander Mirkovic Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identi ty in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843), in the scienti fi c 
journal Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.147
75 Yanna Delivoria,The noti on of nati on: the emergence of a nati onal ideal in the narrati ves of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Greeks in the nineteenth 
century, in the editi on Roderick Beaton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece: Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past 
(1797–1896), (Centre for Hellenic Studies King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham,UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 
2009), p.109-120
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78 Yannis Hamilakis, Double Colonizati on – The Story of the Excavati ons of the Athenian Agora(1924-1931), Hesperia: The Journal of the Ameri-
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enjoyed unparalleled local support in the resistance to the fi cti onal “ancient” 
language “Katharevousa”, which was inapplicable to the modern ti mes.79 
Part of the local elites and the Greeks of the Diaspora persistently noted that 
this arti fi cial language was an obstacle to the development of educati on and 
promoted illiteracy among the general populati on of the kingdom. 
Nevertheless, the confrontati on of the western Hellenism “installed”80 in the new 
kingdom with the local culture of its subjects did not have only local and personal 
implicati ons. On the contrary, “the new nati onal name, Hellenes, also consti tuted 
an obvious disconti nuity with the past 1500 years (and all the traditi ons, culture 
and symbols associated with it) and created enormous tension between the 
Hellenism and the Romiosyni (local Christi an identi ty), which will present itself as 
diffi  cult to overcome.”81
The Romaioi identi ty, dominant in the traditi on of local elites in the nineteenth 
and early twenti eth century, remained a prominent politi cal alternati ve to the 
intensively promoted Hellenic identi ty. This local concept of identi ty, associated 
with the terms “Romiosyni” or “Romaioi”, “dissociates modern Greek identi ty 
from the Classical past, and adopts (and advocated) a more diff used, popular 
and immediate feeling for identi ty” among the local populati on, linking it to 
the traditi on of “self-nominati on of Greeks (Orthodox Christi ans) during the 
Byzanti ne and Ott oman centuries.” 82The proud and long ti me independent 
elites that carried the Greek revolt found early their allies in Constanti nople 
and conti nental cultural elites of the Romaioi cultural context of the Ott oman 
Empire. These elites who viewed the Greek kingdom as a hotbed of the liberati on 
movement of Christi ans in the Ott oman Empire were reluctant to abandon 
their visions for a Romaioi Kingdom and Romaioi identi ty. At the beginning of 
the twenti eth century (in 1909), the fi rst integrated “History of the Romaioi” 
was published in Athens, sparking a lively debate in Greek society. Of course, 
the main opponents of such a historical view and literary undertaking were the 
classic archaeologists, who unti l that moment experienced the climax of their 
organizati on and social visibility in the kingdom of Greece.83
79 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: 
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82 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: 
Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.214
83 Daniel Paul Payne, The Revival of Politi cal Hesychasm in Greek Orthodox Thought: A Study of the Hesychasm Basis in the Thought of John S. 
Romanides and Christos Yannaras, dissertati on, Mentor Derek H. Davis (J. M. Dawson Insti tute of Church-State Studies, USA, 2006), p.417
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GREEK POLITICAL ELITES AND NEO ORTHODOXY
A considerable number of representati ves and groups of local elites in the 
Greek kingdom were in constant confrontati on and rebellion against the new 
“Western” rulers since kingdom’s establishment. Through this struggle, they 
acquired signifi cant aspects of their modern identi ty. Tying their identi ty to 
Constanti nople and Asia, they produced the Greek “Great Ideal” early in the 
kingdom’s history. Called someti mes the “Megali Idea,” this concepti on, at 
least in theory, connected the lost “Romaioi” world of the locals, urging for 
its credenti als as an indigenous culture of the broader Eastern Mediterranean 
cultural space. At the same ti me, this collecti ve vision was seen by groups and 
members of the local elites and certain politi cal leaders as an opportunity for this 
poorest84 part of the “Greek world” to become self-sustainable and overthrow 
western dominati on.85 
These and such anti -Western overtones86 and traditi ons were further 
strengthened by the development of left ist ideas in the world and certainly 
contributed to their great popularity in Greece. In this sense, the eff orts and 
ideas of many Greek communists and anarchists can be placed in the wider 
corpus of the anti -colonial movement in the world in many respects.87 In 
contemporary Greece, more and more, as in the Middle East, local cultural and 
religious traditi ons questi on the identi ty, symbols and culture imposed by the 
“Western colonialists”.88
However the specifi c case of Greece has important features that make this issue 
more complex for the future of Europe and the wider trends in internati onal 
relati ons. Namely, in other enti ti es of the eastern and southern Mediterranean, 
which were also subjected to identi ty change infl uenced by European “classical” 
ideas, such as Persia, Syria, Phoenicia, Egypt, Libya, etc., the Christi an elites, as 
in Greece, were among the most dominant in the acceptances of the western 
84 Richard Clogg, А Concise History of Greece, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, USA, 1997, fi rst printed 1992), p.48
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culture and identi ti es in order to emancipate themselves from the rule of Muslim 
rulers.89
In reacti on to this colonial past, in these regions in recent decades we witness 
revival of the pre-colonial identi ti es, culture and of social relati ons,90 while 
Christi an minoriti es oft en fall victi m to this radical side-eff ect of the western 
dominati on. 91 In Greece, however, a small territory with very limited human 
and natural resources, the Christi an populati on did not emancipate from the 
Muslim rulers, as in other regions of the spacious “Old world.” Muslims in this 
region were eliminated during the “Greek uprising.” The contradicti on of this 
development was that the new Western elites, unlike in other regions, in Greece 
ruled not over the predominantly Muslim religious or mixed populati ons but 
over the Orthodox Christi ans that the West had consistently called Greeks for 
centuries. Thus, in Greece the Christi an, not the Muslim, elites show long-term 
animosity towards the West and the social and cultural phenomena associated 
with its infl uence.
Today, many researchers, analysts and concerned observers are puzzled with the 
picture of the united front of the far-right and far-left  voices in Greek society, on 
the basis of their anti -western senti ments, as well as the pro-Russian sympathies 
and politi cal inclinati ons. The roots of these recently amplifi ed overtones and 
developments are deeply embedded in the politi cal constellati ons in pre-War 
and Cold-War Greece. The ideological isolati on from Western liberal trends, 
mastered for decades by the totalitarian right-wing regimes ruling over Greece 
added new aspects in the Greek misunderstanding with the West. At the 
same ti me, equally crippling were the deep mistrust and the long-term grudge 
towards the West of the suppressed left ist oppositi on. Additi onally, during the 
Cold War era and aft er, prominent Greek scholars and professors, such as John 
S. Romanides and Christos Yannaras, “arti culated the neo-Orthodoxy as an 
alternati ve Greek Orthodox identi ty vis-à-vis the West”, thus transcending the 
religious misunderstandings with the West, into wider ideological and politi cal 
clash. 92
In the new challenging and increasingly multi -polar global realiti es, and in the 
light of certain weakening and short-comings of the Western global infl uence, 
the concept of Neo-Orthodoxy93 amplifi es its scope and politi cal implicati ons. 
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London, UK & New York, USA, 2002),  p.165-167
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These tendencies in the “Slavic-Orthodox sphere,” where Hunti ngton’s notorious 
arti cle places Greece, as well,94 certainly fi nd ferti le soil in the pre-nati onal 
identi ti es and the traditi onal anti -Western senti ment of Greek society. In such 
a context, the unifi cati on of the radical left  opti on SYRIZA95 and the radical right 
party “Independent Greeks” in the governmental “double-populist coaliti on”, 
whose only common ground are the “pro-Russian tones in Athens”, represents 
an important indicator of the challenges and politi cal dilemmas that the Greek 
society faces today. 96
Equally representati ve parameters for certain aspects of the worldview of Greek 
politi cal elites are the positi ons of the leaders of the parti cularly infl uenti al 
Orthodox Church in Greece,97 presented and propagated through public 
comments and arguments, like those of the Athenian bishop Christodoulos. 
He suggests, in line with the post-colonial syndrome and in the framework of 
the “Eastern” stereotype, that the history and culture of Greece (with a focus 
on “Hellenic” Byzanti um) should not be analyzed under the infl uence or in 
relati on to contemporary Western and non-Greek scholars. Aft er privati zing 
and nati onalizing the Byzanti ne cultural heritage and suggesti ng that it is not 
a part of the Western world, the archbishop contradicts his previous positi ons 
by claiming that it is the basis for the creati on of the European identi ty. For the 
modern historians, sociologists and anthropologists in Greece and the world 
underline that “this atti  tude (and the more general line of the Greek Orthodox 
Church) could be compared with modern Islamic atti  tudes on history” and as 
such represents an example par excellence of the post-colonial aspects of Greek 
culture and identi ty. 98
A prominent historian of Athens University and Chairman of the Board of the 
Internati onal Commission for History and Theory of Historiography, professor 
Antonis Liakos, compares such atti  tudes on the part of the Greek social and 
spiritual leaders with those revisionist Islamic elites, who oft en point out 
that “Islamic history is infl uenced by Western educati on, (which is unable) to 
understand Islam, (because) the mind that will judge Islamic life must be Islamic 
in its essence.” Thus, according to Liakos, in these post-colonial societi es there 
is a “move from the suppression of enti re past periods, located outside the 
Western cultural canon, to the idealizati on of these same periods as disti nct 
94 Dimitris Tziovas, Beyond the Acropolis: Rethinking Neohellenism, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Volume 19, Number 2, (The Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 2001), p.208
95 In contrary to the expectati ons of a dramati c confrontati on of the radical left  and the conservati ve and overwhelmingly infl uenti al Greek 
Church, the trends are moderate and dissimilar to those in other societi es. Andreas Karicis, doctor of philosophy and member of Central 
Committ ee of SYRIZA has elaborated this ideologically unusual symbiosis with the words: “What separates the Church and Syriza is much 
less important than what unites them,” adding that “in this ti me when (Western) neo-liberalism att acks European societi es, these two forces 
(SYRIZA and the Church) are naturally found on the same side: that of resistance and human values.”
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96 Macro Update: Greek chaos, Italian success, Russian risk, Berenberk Macro Flesh, (Joh. Berenberg, Gossler & Co., London, UK, 2015), p.3
97 James Petti  fer, The Greek Crisis – A Pause, The Balkan Series, (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, UK, 2010), p.3
98 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: 
Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.209
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cultural features (of these societi es) and as (their) contributi ons to universal 
civilizati on.”99
GREEK ELITES AND CLASSICAL GREECE
The complex aspects of the contemporary Greek nati onal and cultural narrati ve, 
implying inherent animosity towards some of the values, symbols and traditi ons, 
that the European conti nent and its elites consider to be the basis of their 
identi ty, are important, but not the exclusive aspect of the modern identi ty of 
the Greek elites and the Greek society. The analyses of such trends should not 
overesti mate their overall impact, whereas their drasti c forms of occurrence 
in modern Greek politi cs and society should be analyzed in terms of the wider 
crisis of social values and identi ti es in Europe. These aspects of anti -colonial, 
anti -Western and anti -European senti ment make up only one of the layers of 
contemporary Greek identi ty. At the same ti me, one should bear in mind that 
the values and symbols brought or imposed by the Western elites in the last 
two centuries already represent the integral and equally infl uenti al aspect of the 
identi ty of contemporary Greece.  
In this context, any analysis of the contemporary Greek society should take 
into account the results of the intense process of acculturati on “during the 
nineteenth and twenti eth century, (when) modern Greece was “Hellenized” and 
“Hellenism” acquired a modern Greek version.”100 Thus, nowadays the “imagined 
Hellas” of the Western idealisti c intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century is being transformed into and monopolized by a real state, that places 
great emphasis on the identi ti es and symbols of “Hellenism”, once imported 
from the West. 
Moreover, certain modern scholars would underline that from today’s 
perspecti ve, many Greeks culti vate the exact atti  tude and “sense of the past 
(which) was imported in Greece by Western Europe”, because “the awe in which 
the Western world has held the classical traditi on has shaped and reshaped (thus 
succeeded in transforming) Greek apprehension of their own past.”101 
Therefore, despite the fi ndings of contemporary researchers that the creati on 
of the modern Greek identi ty “was not connected (as in some other cases 
in the nineteenth century) with the process of ‘inventi ng the community’ or 
‘inventi ng the traditi on’ by the (local elites) Greeks” but with the “Germans 
99 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: 
Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.209 
Dimitris Damaskos, Archaeology, Nati onal Identi ty and the Greek Museum, (Ann Arbor, Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, USA, 2010)
100 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: Cul-
ture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.229
101 Professor Andromache Gazi cites several European authors on this subject.
Andromache Gazi, PhD thesis, Archaeological Museums in Greece (1829-1909). The Display of Archaeology, Volume One, (Department of 
Museum Studies, University of Leicester,1993), p.37
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imagining Greece, or more precisely, with the Germans imagining Germany 
(in Greece)”, further development and transformati ons have shown certain 
indigenous tendencies.102 The early process of appropriati on of western 
identi ty, symbols and the mythologizati on of Hellenism is associated with the 
needs and aspirati ons of the “Greek Diaspora.” These individuals, directly 
aff ected by the sti gma and the negati ve percepti ons of the West regarding 
the backward Orthodox believers, called Greeks, enthusiasti cally embraced 
the idyllic mysti fi cati on of their supposed “Hellenic” origin.103 Yet, later on, the 
nati onalist historiography, writt en under the German and Western impressions, 
but with Greek signatures, had a wider and more signifi cant infl uence, off ering 
an important avenue for the unifi cati on of the new nati on.104 In this context is 
the statement of Professor Kaplanis from the University of Thessaloniki, that: 
“The only way to explain why generati ons of intellectuals in the nineteenth and 
twenti eth century would try to make a case for  the conti nuity of the Hellenes, 
based on 0.3 per cent of (historical sources) the evidence, while at the same 
ti me so obsti nately ignoring the other 96.5 per cent (that Kaplanis proves to be 
pointi ng to the centuries long conti nuous Romaioi identi ty) is to admit the power 
that the nati onal narrati ve exercises over its subjects.” 105
Finally, in the twenti eth century, not only the elites, but also the broader 
structures of the local populati on had the opportunity to solidify their nati onal 
feeling, through educati on, high culture and nati onal symbols, as well as 
through confrontati on with other identi ti es and nati onal projects in the region. 
Throughout the twenti eth century, inspired by the fables of classical history, 
the “barbarians” who were Hellenized under a Western-European government 
were transformed into fanati cal protagonists of the “assimilati on policy through 
Hellenizati on” of the Christi an populati on in the north of Olympus and in Asia 
Minor. 106
As a result of this complex process, today modern Greek nati onal and state 
identi ty, which unites signifi cant part of Greek citi zens and various groups in the 
Diaspora, undoubtedly rests on the narrati ves and symbols of classical Greece. 
The Hellenic language, as opposed to modern Romaioi, was considered the 
language of anti quity unti l the nineteenth century, while today it represents 
102 Alexander Mirkovic, Who Owns Athens? Urban Planning and the Struggle for Identi ty in Neo-Classical Athens (1832-1843), in the scienti fi c 
journal Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, vol. 34, (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain, 2012), p.157
103 Dimitris Plantzos, A voice less material: classical anti quiti es and their uses at the ti me of the Greek crisis, paper delivered at the colloquium 
Greece / Precarious / Europe, (London, Hellenic Centre, 16 February 2013), p.2
104 Ioannis Koubourlis European historiographical infl uences upon the young Konstanti nos Paparrigopoulos, in the editi on Roderick Beaton, 
David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece: Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Centre for Hellenic Studies 
King’s College, University of London & Ashgate Publishing, Farnham,UK & Burlington, VT, USA, 2009), p.53-64
105 Tassos A. Kaplanis, Anti que Names and Self-Identi fi cati on, in the editi on Dimitris Tziovas, ed. Re-imagining the Past: Anti quity and Modern 
Greek Culture, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.95
106 Lynn Meskell, ed. Archaeology Under Fire: Nati onalism, politi cs and heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, (Routledge, 
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a term used for the language of modern Greeks.107 At the same ti me, the 
liberalized use of the demoti c language in Greece from 1980 by the left -wing 
reformers of the totalitarian society of the Greek military junta is not returning 
to the language of the leaders of the “Greek uprising,” but is accepti ng two 
centuries cleansed, under classical impressions, Romaioi language.108 Today, 
the pre-nati onal culture, religion and the reacti ons of Western dominati on are 
substanti ally balanced by Athens, the Acropolis, the produced “classic” touristi c 
toponymy and numerous archaeological sites across the country. All of these 
contemporary “evidence” confi rm that Hellas is not just a romanti c illusion of 
foreign elites, but a modern nati on proud of its own history and culture.
In strengthening its state and nati onal sovereignty, especially during the 
twenti eth century, the Greek state uti lized, with high fanati cism, the installed 
foreign “classical myth” not only in its relati ons with neighbours, but also, and 
even more drasti cally, in the policies of integrati on and acculturati on applied 
to its citi zens.109 In the att empts to create an integrated and sustainable nati on, 
especially on the territories where there was cultural diversity and aspirati ons 
of residents towards other nati onal and state projects, the nati onal identi ty 
preserved by the puritan norms of the classicists was transformed into a symbol 
of repression and totalitarian tendencies in Greek society.110 In the twenti eth 
century, the traditi onal instability in Greece was complemented by periods of 
radical dictatorships, with ideologies integrati ng elements of the most radical 
forms of nati onalism, xenophobia and racism.111 The ideal of “classical Greece”, 
which at the end of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century was 
designed as a radical liberal movement in Western Europe,112 was transformed 
into a “nati onal” identi ty with racist connotati ons by the European conservati ve 
governments and their colonial mentality in the nineteenth century113 and in the 
twenti eth century was further transformed into a radical doctrine to “protect” 
the identi ty of the unstable Greek state against the new waves of global liberal 
107 Antonis Liakos, Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space , in the editi on Katerina Zacharia, ed. Hellenisms: 
Culture, Identi ty, and Ethnicity from Anti quity to Modernity, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2008), p.208-210
108 John Hutchinson, Nati ons as Zones of Confl ict, (SAGE Publicati ons, London,UK & Thousand Oaks, California, USA & New Delhi, India, 2005), 
p.81
109 Pavlos Hatzopoulos, The Balkans beyond Nati onalism and Identi ty: Internati onal Relati ons and Ideology, (I.B.Tauris & Co, London, UK & New 
York, USA, 2008), p.59,77
110 Dimitra Kokkinidou and Marianna Nikolai, On the Stаge and Behind the Scenes: Greek Archaeology in Times of Dictatorship, in the editi on
Michael L. Galaty Charles Watkinson, Archaelogy under dictatorship, (Springer Science+Business Media, New York, USA, 2004), p.157-158
Erik Sjöberg, PhD thesis, Batt lefi elds of Memory: The Macedonian Confl ict and Greek Historical Culture, (Department of Historical, Philosophi-
cal and Religious Studies Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden, 2011), p.90-97
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and revoluti onary ideas. At the end of the sixti es and early seventi es of the 
twenti eth century, as liberal ideas of pacifi sm and human rights spread from 
Woodstock to Prague and beyond, transcending nati onal, ideological, cultural 
and other barriers, Greece remained isolated under an extremely repressive 
military dictatorship. The “value system of the (Greek) junta (in the seventi es) 
is crystallized in the phrase: ‘Torture is necessary to protect our civilizati on’ 
that one of the dictators expressed in response to the allegati ons by Amnesty 
Internati onal in respect of breaches of human rights in Greece.”114
Yet, even today, for the modern Greek politi cal elites the classical archaeology 
and archaeological sites and artefacts connected to it, provides certain identi ty 
alternati ve to Orthodoxy and the socially infl uenti al Church, with its omnipresent 
religious objects, rituals and events. The classic historical fable appeared as a 
“new religion”115 from the very beginnings of the establishment of the Kingdom 
of Greece, and the “classical archaeology” consti tuted and sti ll consti tutes 
a bridge for the Greek politi cal and intellectual elites to the western world, 
society and values. In this context are the analyses of Professor Marti n Millett  
on classical archaeology and its contemporary connecti on to Greek nati onal 
identi ty. The prominent Briti sh archaeologist and academic, referring to the 
role of Classical Greece, underlines the new scienti fi c and societal realiti es, with 
the words: “Although from a contemporary (scienti fi c) perspecti ve this clearly 
distorts the evidence, creati ng nothing more than a modern myth, it remains 
politi cally powerful, as witnessed in the manipulati on of the Classical past for the 
opening ceremony of the Athens Olympics in 2004.”116       
While modern trends in archaeology and social sciences in general conti nuously 
adjust the analysis, questi oning the fundamental tenets of classical 
archaeology,117 the vibrant infrastructure of foreign archaeological centres and 
teams, originated from the classical focus, represents even today an important 
avenue of intellectual dialogue of the Greek elites with the world. Finally, “the 
secular religion of Hellenism”, built on the narrati ves of classical linguisti cs 
and materialized in the fi ndings and interpretati ons of classical archaeology, 
represents even today an important aspect of the self-cogniti on of Greek elites 
and as such intertwines, complements and democrati zes the growing Neo-
Orthodox tendencies in Greek society. 118
114 Dimitra Kokkinidou and Marianna Nikolai, On the Stаge and Behind the Scenes: Greek Archaeology in Times of Dictatorship, in the editi on
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The complex development of the society and identi ty in modern Greece, 
according to the internati onally prominent American historian, professor 
Suzanne Marchand, is a result of the arti fi cial impositi on of European values and 
identi ti es on the Greek elites of the nineteenth century. This caused long-term 
“misunderstandings” about the values, standards and social relati ons between 
Greece and the Western world that have “unti l today already taken deep 
root.”119 This line of thought is also followed by the Greek classical archaeologist 
at the University of Ioannina, professor Dimitris Damaskos, who explains the 
abuses of historical symbols and narrati ves by modern Greek politi cal leaders 
in the twenty-fi rst century, noti ng that such trends “are well known in cases 
of states which have gained their independence aft er being a satellite of some 
larger power or which are going through the process of decolonizati on”120 In this 
way, Damaskos portrays a complex picture of Greece in the twenty-fi rst century, 
where more than one hundred and eighty years since the proclamati on of the 
Greek kingdom of Ott o, the local and “installed”121 foreign identi ti es and cultures 
create tensions, instability and divisions between politi cal elites and radical social 
movements that will conti nue to transform and change this society in the years 
to come and through it, the wider region located between Europe and Asia.
In this sense, the identi ty buried in outdated premises of classical archaeology, 
as well as the neo-orthodox tendencies in the society which are oft en presented 
as diametrically opposed tendencies of Greek society, represent a unity, seen in 
terms of the reacti ons of local elites before the big waves of cultural, economic, 
demographic and security transformati ons and challenges of the globalizing 
world.
One of the internati onally prominent Greek archaeologists, professor Hamilakis, 
reminds in his analyses that the “integrati on into the European Union and the 
increasing number of immigrants from Balkan countries, from Asia and from 
Africa, may produce a society (in Greece) that is again as multi -cultural as it was 
before the nineteenth century”122, whereas the rapid global changes would, at 
the same ti me, intensively transform the main economic, politi cal and ideological 
paradigms of all European societi es. In this new reality, the Greek politi cal elites 
are confronted with two diff erent paths of response. They may either use their 
conserved ideological and social positi ons in order to “potenti ally undermine 
119 Suzanne Marchand, What the Greek model can, and cannot, do for the modern state: the German perspecti ve, in the editi on Roderick Bea-
ton, David Ricks, ed. The Making of Modern Greece Nati onalism, Romanti cism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), (Ashgate Publishing, 
Aldershot, UK & Burlington, USA, 2009), p.41
120 Dimitris Damaskos, Archaeology, Nati onal Identi ty and the Greek Museum, (lecture) (Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 
2010), p.19
121 Tassos A. Kaplanis, Anti que Names and Self-Identi fi cati on, in the editi on
Dimitris Tziovas, ed. Re-imagining the Past: Anti quity and Modern Greek Culture, (Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2014), p.97
122 Yannis Hamilakis, The Nati on and its Ruins: Anti quity, Archaeology, and Nati onal Imaginati on in Greece , (Oxford University Press, New York, 
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the eff ecti veness of insti tuti onal reforms”123 or they can try to eff ecti vely “aff ect 
politi cal outcomes”124 that will provide answers to the challenges of the society 
and the citi zens of “Greece (that), of course, is constantly changing”.125 
On the other hand, European and Western elites, concerned with the situati on 
in Greece, but also in other troubled regions, through the experience of modern 
Greek history, are confronted with the questi on, if the “multi -cultural ideologies, 
the (self)criti que of Eurocentricity, … and the cultural and demographic changes 
in western societi es”126 are able to create open, modern, democrati c and 
developed societi es or will they additi onally increase diff erences, tensions 
and prejudges. Even more importantly, this historical lesson should help the 
process of reevaluati on of the contemporary practi ces of insistent imposing of 
Western ideas, values and narrati ves. It certainly provides arguments that some 
of these contemporary practi ces represent reminiscence of the mistakes of the 
nineteenth century and the ignorance for the visions and aspirati ons of the local 
elites.   
Finally, for the scienti fi c community, the example of the modern Greek society 
once again strongly confi rms and questi ons the key aspects of the “relati onship 
of the politi cal elites and the representati on: fi rst, that “politi cal elites have a 
need to manipulate cultural identi ti es”; second, that “certain cultural identi ti es, 
are fi tt ed candidates for manipulati on, and others are not given any chance”; 
and third and parti cularly important in contemporary dynamic global reality that 
“certain aspects of the identi ty become especially important at certain ti mes and 
politi cally irrelevant in others.”127
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